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Reply Argument 
Metro, joined by the other appellees, fails to persuade that summary judgment was 
properly granted on this record After reviewing Metro's unconvincing contentions, the 
Court should reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling and remand for further 
proceedings 
1. Metro's factual arguments fail to persuade that summary judgment was 
properly granted. 
Metro peppers its briefing with factual argument. This avails nothing on review of 
summary judgment. Factual arguments are for the trier of fact, with the Court indulging 
every inference that is reasonable in favor of the landowners. See USA Power, LLC v. 
PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, U 28, 235 P.3d 749. On cross-motions such as those brought 
below, moreover, the denial of one motion does not mean the other is granted; rather, a 
movant in Metro's shoes must independently establish entitlement to a judgment. 
See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, H 10, 94 P.3d 179; Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). Here, Metro's disputed factual arguments serve only to confirm that 
summary judgment was improvidently granted. 
First, Metro argues incorrectly that the landowners do not own land within the 
canal reaches. Second, Metro argues that its uses of the canal are consistent with 
historical uses. Third. Metro argues that the parties agree with the benefits of its 
aqueduct project and have not challenged its burdens. Before turning to the substance of 
Metro's legal contentions in Parts II through IV, infra, the landowners will address each 
of these erroneous fact-based contentions in turn in this Part I. 
A. Metro did not appeal the district court's ownership determinations 
allowing the landowners to challenge Metro's uses. 
The district coun determined as a matter of undisputed fact that the landowner 
appellants own the land comprising the reaches of the canal at issue in this case 
Reach 16 is currently owned by plaintiffs Costanza 
Reach 17 is currently owned b\ plaintiffs Stern and Richins (Richins owns 
property on the west side of Reach 17 and Sterns [sic] owns property on the east 
side of Reach 17) 
Reach 18 is currently owned by plaintiff BeroJatti (Berolatli owns property on the 
west side of Reach 18) 
Plaintiff Cummings owns property on the west side of Reach 19 and claims 
ownership to the center line of the canal 
(R 1859-60) The Municipal Parties did not appeal these determinations and cannot be 
heard to complain about them now See Holmes Dev, LLC v Cook Dev, LC. 2002 UT 
38. T| 55. 48 P 3d 895 (unappealed summary judgment determinations are established for 
purposes of appeal). Terry v Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution. 617 P 2d 700. 
701-02 (Utah 1980) (a party cannot seek to enlarge or modify rights established in the 
district court without appealing) 
Despite these established rulings, Metro nevertheless makes a variety of factual 
arguments regarding ownership status relying on extrinsic evidence (Aplee Br. 9-12, 
22-23, 28-29.) If construed properly, the original conveyance documents show that no 
more than easements were granted, making resort to extrinsic evidence unnecessary. 
See Green River Canal Co v Thayn, 2003 UT 50, \ 17, 84 P.3d 1134 (court construes 
unambiguous documents as a matter of law). Moreover, the district court did not rule on 
Metro's factual arguments below, and this Court should not address them for the first 
time. See Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v Salt Lake County. 2007 UT 72. ^ 29. 
167 P.3d 1080 (appeals court should allow district court to pass upon factual matters in 
the first instance); R.186L 1865-68. Tracing title descriptions through deeds is not 
appellate court work in the first instance. 
If countenanced for the first time on appeal, however, the record would preclude 
summary judgment in favor of Metro. The "line** of the canal referred to in the 
conveyance documents is the center line of the canal - the only defined line of the canal 
in the documents. (Aplee. Br. 10-12 & record citations therein.) Thus, the "West** or 
"westerly" line describes the center line approaching from the east; the "East" line 
describes it approaching from the west. (Aplee. Br. 10-12.) The Reach 18 deeds also run 
expressly "to the center of the canal'* excepting out the "Draper Irrigation Right-of-
Way." (R.212-13, 506,642.) 
Additionally, the conveyance documents Metro cites refer to the Municipal 
Parties' interests as a "right of way" or "Right-of-Way" across the reaches - supporting 
the landowners'position, not Metro's. (R.590, 642; see also R. 1265, 1271.) The 1951 
Costanza deed on Reach 16 excepts out "that portion thereof, conveyed to Utah Lake 
Irrigation Company," which is fully consistent with a right of way. (R.500, 582.) The 
amount paid for Reach 18 is evidentiary argument and subject to diametrically opposed 
inferences. (See infra, Part U.C, discussing same.) The tax assessor's maps are evidence, 
not conclusive determinations, related to underlying ownership. (Aplee. Br. 10-12, 28-
3 
29.) Construed m their most favorable light, these facts favor the landowners' position 
and the district court's ruling. 
In sum. the arguments Metro raises on appeal concerning the ownership of the 
canal should not be considered in the first instance by this Court, where the district court 
made determinations that have not been appealed and the record supports the landowners* 
position. 
B. Metro's factual contentions are disputed regarding the types and 
sources of water used in the canal. 
A culinary pipeline, storm drain, and trail were not the historical uses of the canal. 
The canal was historically used for irrigation purposes. Metro expanded the uses and 
now seeks to justify that expansion to avoid having to pay for its additional uses. But its 
modern uses are not consistent with the historical uses. 
In 1975. Draper Irrigation represented that it owned and operated "irrigation 
canals in Salt Lake County for the purpose of providing irrigation water to its 
shareholders, and for no other purpose." (R.346.) Draper Irrigation's "allowing" Salt 
Lake County to run storm drainage from 1975 to 1993 was not a "dedicated . . . 
additional public use" as Metro now argues. (Aplee. Br. at 7.) No document supports 
this bald legal assertion, which is not an undisputed fact. See Niehon v. Sandberg, 141 
P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1943) (easement is limited to use established at time of granting). 
1
 The district court decision and the opening brief suggest that Bayard and Matilda 
Crosgrove were the original grantors on both Reaches 16 and 17. For the sake of 
clarification, Bayard and Matilda Crosgrove were the grantors on Reach 16, and Charles 
and Elizabeth Crosgrove the grantors on Reach 17, a fact with which Metro agrees. 
(R.948, 958; Aplee. Br. 9-10.) 
Draper Irrigation was never granted rights to allow/ storm drainage - rights the 
irrigation company itself recognized as distinct from the rights obtained for its canal 
(R.346) - and there is no claim they were acquired by any party through prescriptive use. 
The landowners adduced record evidence that the only storm drainage in the canal after 
1993 was incidental. (R. ] 1045 1192.) Any alleged "rights** in Salt Lake County to run 
storm drainage terminated altogether in 1999. and there is no documentary evidence to 
support the asserted "transfer*' of rights from Salt Lake County to Draper City. (R.379-
80.) Summary judgment cannot be sustained on the basis of Metro's factually disputed 
appellate arguments. 
Nor can Metro look to Draper Irrigation as the source of the rights it now asserts 
on the canal property. When Draper Irrigation quitclaimed its land interests to Draper 
City, it ltreserve[ed] an easement for its irrigation pipelines." (Aplee. Br. at 8, citing 
R.340, 383-94.) The historical irrigation water rights thus remained with Draper 
Irrigation, which then piped its irrigation water across land distant from the reaches at 
issue in this case - not in the reaches themselves, as Metro implies. (R.903. 1104; Aplee. 
Br. 13.). Draper City (and subsequently Metro) did not succeed to those rights, and all 
other uses to which the canal property have been put are outside the scope of rights 
Draper Irrigation received from Utah Lake Irrigation. Metro simply cannot factually 
trace its alleged rights to culinary water or storm drainage back through Draper City to 
Draper Irrigation and Utah Lake Irrigation, and certainly not as a matter of undisputed 
fact or law. 
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Indeed. Metro s own description of its aqueduct operations in its appeal brief 
demonstrates the remarkable transformation Metro has sought to impose on the canal, 
from the canal's original use serving the southern part of the Salt Lake valley for 
irrigation to a vastly different purpose serving as a clearing house for culinary water use 
throughout the greater Salt Lake area 
The District is a metropolitan water district. and provides municipal 
water to Salt Lake City and Sandy City, who in turn provide water to residences 
and businesses both within their boundaries and to significant portions of the Salt 
Lake Valley outside their boundaries The District also provides significant 
quantities of surplus water to the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, the 
other large public water provider m Salt Lake County Since 2005. the District has 
been constructing $250 million in new facilities to address critical public needs for 
additional water treatment and conveyance, system redundancy and reliability, and 
more efficient use of water supplies 
As part of this program, the District constructed the $60 million Point of the 
Mountain Aqueduct (the "Aqueduct") - a 60-inch diameter buried pipe connecting 
the District's new Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant with its existing 
Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant and Jordan Valley's facilities. The 
Aqueduct provides an essential link between east and west side water systems, and 
fulfills a number of important water supply and management functions, better 
utilizing high spring flows, providing system redundancy in the event of a failure 
or shutdown of some portion of the system, and conserving other critical sources 
of water. 
(Aplee. Br 5. record citations and internal references omitted.) The uses Metro now 
asserts are not the same as those originally granted; rather, they represent a significant 
expansion beyond the scope of the original Utah Lake Irrigation canal grants. See also 
infra Part 111 (discussing use exceeding the scope of the grants). 
In sum, Metro's factual contentions regarding the historical consistency of its 
current uses are anything but established, undisputed fact. 
C. Metro's factual assertions regarding the burdens and benefits imposed 
by its project are disputed. 
Metro suggests the landowners have not disputed Metro's alleged benefits of the 
aqueduct project nor identified any increased burdens they have suffered (Aplee Br. 6.) 
This assertion is disputed. The alleged benefits came about not because Metro added an 
aqueduct but because Draper Irrigation Company had previously stopped flowing 
irrigation water. (R.l 100.) The landowners presented evidence that the aqueduct project 
in fact imposed burdens, including the cutting down of vegetation, the disturbance of 
wildlife, the elimination of privacy, the construction of unsightly bunkers - one in front 
of Appellant Stern's front door - and the installation of fiber optic lines in a 
shallow location so that vegetation could not regrow. (R.l 196-97.) The landowners also 
dispute the contention on appeal that the canal has been restored to its original grade. 
(Aplee. Br. 5-6; R. 1099, 1196-97.) 
The landowners have gone from secluded parcels of property in a heavily wooded 
area to living in an altered landscape with a public parkway in their front and back yards. 
The burdens are not only self-evident (R.l206-10, 1212) but have been demonstrated in 
the record. As with Metro's other factual contentions, there is a divergence in the record 
on material points underlying the district court's summary judgment ruling. 
This Court should not sustain a summary judgment when the factual 
underpinnings asserted on appeal are wholly suspect. Reversal is called for along with a 
remand for further proceedings necessary to support a proper final judgment. See also 
infra part IV (discussing factual disputes underlying abandonment analysis). 
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11. Met ros conveyance arguments do violence to the terms of the conveying 
documents and the governing law. 
In addition to Metro's erroneous factual contentions. Metro's legal arguments are 
off base. These will be discussed next, beginning with Metro's erroneous contentions 
regarding construction of the underlying conveyances. 
A. Metro's arguments regarding the standards for construing the 
voluntary conveyances on Reaches 16 and 17 miss the mark. 
Metro acknowledges that the language of the Crosgrove Grants is unambiguous 
and should be construed as a matter of law/. (Aplee. Br. at 17. 22.) But every part of a 
deed must be given effect - something Metro's interpretation fails to do. See Haynes v 
Hunt, 85 P.2d 861. 863 (Utah 1939); Tretheway v Furstenau, 2001 UT App 400. U 9. 40 
P.3d 649. 
First. Metro argues there is a presumption of a fee simple conveyance when 
property is transferred pursuant to a warranty deed. (Aplee. Br. 18.) This is not true. 
The presumption Metro cites applies only when a deed without limiting language appears 
on its face to convey a fee simple - which is not the case here. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-3. Utah statutes then and now provide for no such presumption when language on the 
face of the document itself evidences the intention to convey a lesser estate. 2 Compiled 
Laws of the State of Utah § 4871 (1917); Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (2010). Notably, the 
language of the Crosgrove Grants does not follow the form of the short form warranty 
deed described in the statutes. See 2 Compiled Laws of the State of Utah § 4881 (1917); 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12(1). Instead, the Crosgrove Grants include the language 
restricting the use of the strip of land "for canal purposes only/* The Court must give 
effect to that differentiating language. 
Second. Metro invokes a description, originating from Blackstone. of the historical 
"formal and orderly" parts of a deed. See 9 Thompson on Real Property, Second Thomas 
Edition § 82.07(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 1999) (quoting 2 William Blackstone. 
Commentaries on the Law of England, ch. XIX (1765)); Aplee. Br. 18-19. Notably, 
however, the treatise observes that "[t]he adoption of statutory short form deeds by state 
legislatures . . . has played a significant role in the rather wholesale departure from the 
'formal and orderly part* format." Id. § 82.07(b). At the time the Crosgrove Grants were 
made, Utah had adopted just such a short form deed. See 2 Compiled Laws of the State 
of Utah § 4881 (1917); see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12(1). 
More importantly, though, the Crosgrove Grants do not follow the historical 
pattern (or the statutory form). There are no habendum or tenendum clauses including 
"to have and to hold" language in either one. To the contrary, all language following the 
description of the parties and the recital of consideration constitutes the effective 
habendum clause. Nor is there a reddendum clause preceding any covenant or warranty 
clauses. Rather, in Crosgrove Grant I, the reddendum clause reserving for the grantors 
the right to fence across the canal comes after the conveyance for canal purposes only. 
(R.948.) And Metro provides no authority for its unconvincing assertion that the sole 
granting authority in the deed was the "hereby convey and warrant" provision. (Aplee. 
Br. 19.) 
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Nor does Metro demonstrate the Blackstone l formal and orderl) pattern was 
tvpical in Utah at the time of the Crosgro\ e Grants or pro\ ide authority for the 
proposition that courts are required to consider historical patterns in construing deeds 
Instead, the Court is called upon to follow the basic canons of deed and contract 
construction, which mandate that the Court give effect to all unambiguous provisions in a 
conveyance See Haynes. supra In this case, the Crosgrove Grants explicitly limit the 
conveyance to a strip of land for canal purposes only This language may not be 
disregarded See id 
Third. Metro fails to persuasively distinguish the case law Both Jacobson v 
Jacobson. 557 P 2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). and Glauser Storage, LLC v Smedley. 2001 
UT App 141.1H1 20-24. 27 P 3d 565. involved cases where the face of the document 
appeared to convey a fee title while one party argued they were merely security 
instruments It was thus incumbent upon the parties seeking to reform the documents in 
equity to prove their contentions by clear and convincing evidence. See, e g , Mayixme 
Manor, Inc v Stokermatic, Inc.. 597 P 2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979) (to reform an agreement, 
the court must find the parties" intent from clear and convincing evidence). Here, 
however, the landowners are not challenging the language of the Crosgrove Grants as 
different from what the document says on its face. Rather, as in Haynes, the landowners 
are asking the Court simply to construe the face of the document. The clear and 
convincing standard discussed in Jacobson and Smedley does not apply. 
Metro also attempts unpersuasively to distinguish the Utah cases the landowners 
have cited demonstrating that limiting language changes an estate from fee title to an 
easement (Aplee. Br. 20-21.) Metro even speculates about facts that do not appear 
clearly in the case law. (Aplee. Br. 21.) Neither Haynes nor Gold Mountain relied on the 
placement of the limiting language in determining that an easement was granted where 
there was a clause that limited the use of the estate conveyed. See Haynes. 85 P.2d at 
863; Gold Ml Dev., LLC. v. Missouri Flat, LTD, 2005 UT App 276. *4. 
In Haynes, the Court concluded that the limiting language was subsequent to, not 
part of. the granting clause-just as here. 85 P.2d at 863. Placement is not the critical 
inquiry7: instead, the Court's analysis should turn on the language used in the conveying 
instruments. See id, Haynes involved a conveyance almost identical to that in the 
Crosgrove Grants, and the outcome should be the same. See id : see also Reese Howell 
Co. v Brown, 158 P. 684 (Utah 1916) (a deed granting land "so long as it shall be used as 
a passageway" implied a limitation, conferring on grantee the right to terminate the use). 
In short, Metro's arguments on the construction of a deed in fee simple are 
unavailing and should be rejected as a matter of law. 
B. It would be absurd to construe the Crosgrove Grants as containing 
"personal covenants" limiting the land to canal use. 
Even if the Crosgrove Grants were construed as a fee simple with covenants, it 
would be an absurd result if a conveyance of land for use "only" as a canal were 
construed as a personal covenant between the parties and not a covenant that was binding 
on successors in interest. The "canal purposes only" language and the nature of the canal 
itself call for a different outcome. 
11 
The use of particular words or phrases is not required to demonstrate the intent 
lhat a covenant is to run with the land See Suffolk Business Or v Applied Digital Data 
Sys.5%] N E 2d 1320. 1322 (NY 1991). Columbia Club, Jnc v American Fletcher 
Realty Corp . 720 N E 2d 411. 419 (Ind App 1999) ("fN]o particular language is 
required to demonstrate an intent to run with the land**) While language binding "heirs 
and assigns** may be helpful in determining intent, "it is not dispositive and an obligation 
intended to run with the land can be created without such language ** Musgrave v 
Brookhaven Lake Prop Owners Ass n. 990 S W 2d 386. 395 (Tex App 1999) 
Certainly, the absence of such a statement does not prove that the covenant was intended 
to be personal See Moseley v Bishop. 470 N E 2d 773. 776-77 (Ind. 1984) (holding that 
a covenant to maintain a drain was intended to run with the land despite the absence of 
any statement that the covenant was to run with the land or bind the covenantor's heirs 
and assigns)2 
When such language is absent, courts look rather to the circumstances surrounding 
the conveyance to determine the intent of the parties. Id. Certain types of covenants, like 
the one here, by their very nature run with the land. More than just "touching and 
concerning the land,'* the language dictates the very use of the land. As the Indiana 
Supreme Court noted in concluding that a similar restriction ran: 
Given the importance of this drain to [plaintiffs] land, it is improbable that the 
parties intended their agreement to be purely personal and not binding on 
subsequent grantees of the land. Faced with similar agreements relating to 
2
 Metro fails to distinguish or even discuss the Utah cases cited by the landowners in their 
opening brief in support of these propositions. (Opening Br. 18-19.) 
ditches and drains, courts in other jurisdictions have generally found an intent 
that the covenant run with the land. We find as a matter of law that the facts 
surrounding the written agreement and the language used in it show an intent to 
create a covenant running with the land. 
Moseley v Bishop. 470 N.E.2d 773. 776-77 (]nd. 1984) (emphasis added). 
Metro characterizes the "canal purposes only** provisions as "merely expressions 
of negotiations for requirements in exchange for the deeds.*' (Aplee. Br. at 25.) There is 
no support for such an argument in law or logic. The plain language of the Crosgrove 
Grants prohibited the use of the property for any use besides canal use. These were not 
mere recitals indicating negotiations. If any personal covenants are to be found in the 
conveyances, they relate at most to the construction of a bridge and flumes - promises 
made in the documents directly and specifically "for the use of the grantor/* and 
distinguishable in form and kind from the language restricting the use of the land to a 
canal. (R.948-49, 958-60.) 
Metro also suggests the landowners have the burden of proving the covenants run 
by clear and convincing evidence. (Aplee. Br. 24. 26.) The cited authority is a New 
York appellate division case. (Aplee. Br. 24.) Utah has not adopted that standard. See 
Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). Rather, this 
Court construes the covenant just as it would any contract. Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 
UT 16, \ 11, 998 P.2d 807. Even so, the burden is readily met by the language in 
question and the surrounding circumstances, regardless whether a preponderance or 
clear-and-convincing standard applies. The fact that the alleged covenant contains no 
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indicia of a personal covenant is itself persuasive e\ idence that assists in establishing the 
true nature of the restriction as one that runs with the land 
Finally. Metro argues that restrictive covenants of this nature are void on public 
policy grounds because they would preclude the installation of pipelines to supph water 
to local residents (Aplee Br 26 ) That argument misses the point This Court is called 
upon to construe the bargain struck by the parties See SM enson. supra Good policy 
dictates that a user of land be limited to the bargained-for use A party may not invoke 
public policy to justify an expansion of a limited use Parties are free to convey 
easements or enter into deeds containing restrictive covenants with entities that will 
provide benefits for public use. but constitutional and prudential limitations do not turn 
that into carte blanche to use the grant in any way desired without consideration of the 
scope intended by the original grant To the contrary, it would violate the most 
fundamental tenets of constitutional government to sanction an expansion of public use 
rights on such a basis. Metro's bootstrap "public policy** argument should be rejected 
C. Metro has no authority for its "stipulated judgment" argument. 
Reach 18 was conveyed to Utah Lake Irrigation through a stipulated 
condemnation judgment. (R.970-73 ) Metro concedes that "[t]he statutes in force at the 
time of the Crane Judgment appear to have allowed only the taking of an easement for 
this type of condemnation." (Aplee. Br. at 27.)3 This Court's holding in Moon Lake 
3
 Despite its concession, Metro nevertheless purports separately to "dispute" that Utah 
Lake Irrigation was limited to condemning for a right of way, calling this assertion a 
"legal conclusion." (Aplee. Br 12.) This Court, however, "may take judicial notice of 
Water Use)s Association v Hanson 535 P 2d 1262 (Utah 1975) controls The interest 
awarded to Utah Lake Irrigation was the only interest it could receive via condemnation -
an easement on the land, clearly limited to "the purpose of constructing and maintaining a 
canal thereon " (R 970 ) 
Metro's principal argument opposing this point is that the parties stipulated to the 
judgment, thereby distinguishing it from a "contested** judgment (Aplee Br 27-28 ) 
Metro cites no legal authority for this unpersuasive contention The Crane Judgment 
states on its face that "[tjhis action was commenced to condemn the property hereinafter 
described for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a canal thereon** and that 
judgment was entered pursuant to "a decree of condemnation '" (R 970 ) There is no 
dispute that the property was taken in eminent domain through condemnation 
proceedings The Court must consider the instrument relative to the statutes in effect at 
the time See Farmers & Merchants Bank v Federal Reserve Bank. 262 U S 649. 660 
(1923). Clark v CSX Transp Jnc , 737 N E.2d 752, 758-59 (Ind App 2000) 
Metro presents a factual argument that the amount paid for the stipulated judgment 
evidences consideration for a fee parcel, not a right of way (Aplee Br 11,28) Metro's 
suggestion is pure conjecture, presenting no evidence of the underlying negotiations or 
the basis for the deal. The judgment amount was negotiated freely between the parties 
and could evidence anything from attorney fee avoidance by one or both parties to a 
purely business decision to a condemnor's attempt to secure a judgment given the 
the laws of this State, past and present." Roy S Ludlow lnv Co v Salt Lake County, 499 
P.2d 283, 285 (Utah 1972). 
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uncertamn of a trial, or any other number of considerations. The record would have to 
be developed further before am conclusion could be drawn about the significance of the 
amount paid. On summary judgment, the landowners are entitled to have the inferences 
drawn in favor of them, not against them. 
Lastly. Metro fails even to address the case law demonstrating the use of the 
phrase "in fee" as consistent with the taking of a right of way. (Opening Br. 23-24.) This 
is one more point that reconciles the judgment in condemnation with the statutory law of 
condemnation prevailing in Utah at the time. It further confirms the landowners* reading 
and calls for a reversal of the district court. 
111. The Municipal Parties do not have the right to use Reaches 16-19 to pipe 
water or for culinary water, storm drainage, or a public trail. 
A. Metro's uses exceed the scope of the canal grants. 
The grants in favor of Utah Lake Irrigation in Reaches 16-19 were, respectively, 
"for canal purposes only," "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a canal 
thereon/* and to "take and acquire and have for its use a right of way for its canal and for 
the construction, operation and perpetual maintenance of said canal." (R.948. 958. 970. 
979.) The plain language of these documents dictates the use. 
The word "canal" is not ambiguous. At the time of the conveyances, as noted 
already, the word "canal" was defined as an "artificial channel filled with water and 
designed for navigation, or for irrigating land." Webster's Dictionary (1913). Metro 
ignores this dictionary definition, suggesting instead that the Court look to the translation 
of the French word from which "canal" is derived. (Aplee. Br. 31.) Derivations of words 
are not the plain meaning and usage of words The Court should look to the actual 
definition of the word "canal" for its plain meaning. 
Metro relies on Utah Light & Traction Co. v. United States, 230 F. 343 (8th Cir. 
1915). to argue that the term "canal" included underground pipes that conveyed water. 
(Aplee. Br at 32.) Utah Light did not involve the construction of express and limited 
easement language and is inapplicable. The case turned on distinct statutory language 
related to rights of way across federal land. See id. at 345. In contrast Utah statutory 
law regarding eminent domain power clearly recognized a difference between "canals,'* 
"aqueducts.** and "pipes," authorizing the taking of each separately and by name. See 2 
Compiled Laws of Utah, § 3588(3) (1907). The easements at issue here obtained the 
right to use the land for a "canal" only- not for aqueducts or pipes. 
The word "canal" is not ambiguous, as were the easement phrases in the cases 
Metro cites: Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3rd Cir. 
1994), where the phrase "a right to the water of said bay" could be interpreted as either a 
right to take water away or a right to use the water for fishing and swimming; and 
Kimlow, Inc. v. Seminole Landing Ass n, 586 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. App. 1991), where a 
utility line could include any type of utility line, including a sewer line. The language of 
the conveyance documents in the instant case forbids an expansive interpretation. It is 
unnecessary for a party to enumerate all the many things an easement may not be used 
for. Instead, parties are required to abide by the fixed use assigned in the granting 
language. 
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Metro contends that even if the Court were to look to extrinsic evidence, the facts 
indicate there should be a broad interpretation of the word "canal." (Aplee Br. 32.) The 
record shows otherwise - and it certainly does not establish Metro's position as a matter 
of law/. Draper Irrigation used the canal for decades solely to deliver irrigation water. 
(R.346.) This Court holds that an easement is limited in scope to the rights acquired at 
the time they accrued and vested. See Nielson v Sandberg. 14] P.2d 696. 697 (Utah 
1943). 
The Court's analysis need go no further. The word "canal** does not encompass a 
storm drainage ditch, a five-foot wide culinary water aqueduct, complete with large 
concrete blocks, or a walking trail. The use of the property for these purposes exceeds 
the scope of the real property grants. 
B. The Municipal Parties improperly changed the uses of the land. 
Utah case law does not permit an easement holder to use its rights for a different 
purpose than the one described in the express easement. The cases Metro relies upon are 
inapposite: the purpose for which the property was used in those cases was the same 
before and after changes within the scope of the easement. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305,312-13 (Utah 1998) (using land to transport irrigation water before and 
after installing PVC pipes); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596, 
596 (Utah 1945) (using land to transport irrigation water before and after waterproofing 
ditches to improve the efficiency of such transportation); Abbott v. Nampa Sck Dist. No. 
737, 808 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 1991) (using land to transport irrigation water before and after 
converting to pipes). 
Furthermore. Metro all but ignores that this Court's opinions in Valcarce and 
Moyle dealt with the scope of prescriptive easements, rather than express easements. 
There were no written agreements in those cases dictating the purposes for which the 
property could be used. Rather, the parties were simply allowed to use their prescriptive 
easements for the same general purposes for which they had previously used them. This 
is a distinction with a difference. In the instant case, Metro is bound by the terms of the 
express easements. It may only use those easements for the operation and maintenance 
of a canal. Metro may not change that expressly authorized use. See Nielson v 
Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1943) (an easement, being a burden upon the land it 
traverses, is limited to the uses for which it was acquired). 
The Idaho case Metro discusses, Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 808 P.2d 
1289 (Idaho 1991), drives home the point. The Idaho Supreme Court held that lt[t]he use 
of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation must be confined strictly to the 
purposes for which it was granted or reserved, and in compliance with any restrictions 
imposed by the terms of the instrument." Id. at 1293 (quoting 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements 
and Licenses § 74, at 479-80 (1966)). The Court permitted the easement holder to pipe 
the irrigation ditch pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1207, which expressly permitted the 
person controlling irrigation land to bury the irrigation ditch. This is a far cry from 
changing the use of the canal to a culinary water pipe and walking trail and adding uses 
by Metro and other municipal corporations. See Sandberg, 141 P.2d at 697 (easement 
"was not reserved for anyone who may thereafter decide that he wanted to convey some 
19 
w ater over the land") While Metro would be entitled to improve and use the canal, the 
easement is not granted in "general terms'" but is confined to use as a canal. 
Metro argues that the case law. in general, allows utilization of improved 
technology developed after the grant of the easement. See, e g . Cox v Hanlen. 953 P.2d 
294. 299 (MM. Ct. App. 1998) (person using ditch pursuant to easement could maintain 
easement with more modern methods, e g a tractor); C/R T. V v Shannondale, Inc., 27 
F.3d 104. 108 (4th Cir. 1994) (cable company allowed to use fiber optic cables, 
indistinguishable in appearance from a telephone wire, to transmit data); Camp Meeker 
Water Sys , Inc. v Public Utilities Comm 'n. 799 P.2d 771 (Cal. 1990) (easement holder 
who had right to use water resources could use new sources of water found on servient 
parcel). These cases, however, do not allow an easement holder to change the use of the 
property, but only to employ improved technology for uses already granted. 
Metro also argues that the burden on the land is no greater as a result of its 
changed use. This is immaterial to the summary judgment determination: a use change is 
not allowed regardless of the burden. See Abbott, 808 P.2d at 1293. Even so, the 
landowners presented evidence of the increased burdens. Before the use change, the land 
in question afforded privacy, grazing areas for horses, and beautiful and valuable 
aesthetics to the Landowners. (R.l 193.) Trees, grasses, and vegetation allowed the 
owners of the servient estate to enjoy the wildlife that was able to prosper in the natural, 
vegetative area. (R.l 192-93.) Once Metro staked an easement across the canal property, 
however, it eradicated the trees and vegetation, erected large concrete air valve structures 
(9? x 9' blocks, photos of which are available at R.1207-08 & 1212), and forced the 
landowners to remove persona) property from their adjoining real estate. Metro also built 
a public walking trail increasing the foot traffic across the landowners* property. (See 
also supra Part l.D.) The increased burdens are demonstrated in the record. 
The district court incorrectly concluded that Metro's expanded use of the land for 
markedly different purposes than those permitted by the terms of the express easement 
did not exceed the scope of the easements. This Court should reverse that erroneous 
determination. 
C. Public policy requires just compensation be paid for expanding the 
uses of private property obtained for public use. 
The Utah Constitution provides that tw[p]rivate property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST. I, xxii. This 
constitutional mandate overrides the public policy considerations Metro advocates in its 
brief. 
Metro argues that the Court should broadly interpret the unambiguous terms of the 
express easements because the property has been used to deliver water to local residents. 
While this may be an important public policy, it does not trump the right of individuals to 
own and enjoy their property. Public works impacting private property owners must pay 
for what they take - they cannot simply invoke the public good to proceed as they wish. 
The terms of the easements are unambiguous and limited. If Metro desires to 
expand the use, it is obligated to pay for it, just as every other utility provider must do. 
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]V. Abandonment should not have been decided as a matter of la\> on this 
materially disputed fact record. 
Metro's abandonment and diversion arguments are factual]) intense and subject to 
competing inferences. Metro narrowly characterizes the landowners' abandonment 
argument as if it were arguing to a jury. However, the facts and inferences themselves. 
viewed in their most favorable light, show/ abandonment of canal rights by Draper 
Irrigation of such a clear and convincing nature that a trier of fact could properly find for 
the landowners. 
Draper Irrigation and Draper City informed one landowner who complained of a 
car in the canal that it was her responsibility to remove the car from the canal. (R.1225). 
Draper Irrigation constructed an entirely new irrigation system utilizing property far 
away from the reaches at issue in this case. (R.903, R.l 104: Aplee. Br. 13.) Metro does 
not actually dispute that Draper Irrigation's water was diverted away from the canal but 
argues (without legal backing) that this involved an esoteric water law issue beyond the 
understanding of these landowners. (Aplee. Br. 45.) Nevertheless, the meaning of a 
"Permanent'* water change application, stating that the structure necessary to deliver 
water into Reaches 16 through 19 was abandoned for good, is not hard to understand; nor 
is the correlative inference that those reaches were consequently permanently abandoned 
as well. (R.l 158, 1106, 1161.) 
The landowners dispute the contention that "Draper Irrigation always maintained 
its interests in [Reaches 16-19] for water conveyance facilities." (Aplee. Br. 7.) The 
self-serving statement of a Draper Irrigation employee to that effect is a legal conclusion 
and is subject to cross-examination and discrediting. (R.339.) The notices of interest 
filed by Draper Irrigation in 1983 and 1998 were simply recorded to bolster the fact that 
just the opposite was happening: Draper Irrigation had not maintained an ongoing interest 
and was thus vulnerable to attack by third parties, jeopardizing its potential to obtain 
valuable consideration from other municipal entities for the use of its land. (R.83. 93-94. 
346-51. 353-62.) No authority holds that merely asserting rights after the fact is effective 
to grant such rights. The abandonment arguments as presented by Metro on appeal are 
matters of factual dispute, including the date on which Draper Irrigation ceased flowing 
water through the canal - 1993 or 1995 - a two-year difference that makes a difference in 
such an analysis. (Aplee. Br. 7. 13.) 
The inferences belong to the landowners and militate in favor of reversing 
summary judgment on the abandonment claim. See USA Power, LLC, supra. A trier of 
fact should determine whether Draper Irrigation possessed and demonstrated the requisite 
intent to abandon. The landowners adduced clear and convincing evidence of 
abandonment. (See also Opening Br. 37-42.) Metro's arguments to the contrary are 
factual in nature and should be presented to a fact finder. (Aplee. Br. at 44-45.) On 
summary judgment, "all facts and the reasonable inferences to be made therefrom should 
be construed in a light favorable to the non-moving party." USA Power, LLC v. 
PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31 ^ 335 235 P.3d 749. Draper Irrigation's affirmative statements 
disclaiming responsibility for the canal and the permanent change application that would 
forever cease the flow of irrigation waters through the canal reaches (Draper 
Irrigation's avowed sole purpose for the canal), in addition to an utter failure to maintain 
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the canal for man\ \ears. far exceed the evidence of abandonment advanced in the cases 
cited b\ Metro This issue should go to the trier of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the district court's judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. The law firmly calls for that result on this record. 
DATED this 1 8,h day of January. 2011. 
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"Because of the district court's substantive ruling on abandonment, the court considered 
the landowners' motion regarding reinstatement of their abandonment claim to be moot. 
(R.l 868.) On appeal. Metro does not urge this as a separate ground for affirmance. 
(Aplee. Br. 42 n.9.) The district court should resolve this unaddressed motion in the first 
instance on remand. Metro provides no Utah authority for the proposition that a higher 
standard than clear and convincing evidence applies to the abandonment of public uses. 
(Aplee. Br. 44, 46-47.) 
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 The district court applied its ruling on summary judgment not only to Metro, but also to 
the Municipal Parties joining in Metro's arguments below, who have joined again on 
appeal. (R. 2444; see Joinders dated 11/29/10, filed with the Court.) This Court's 
reversal of summary judgment in favor of Metro should therefore likewise apply to 
reverse the judgment as to the other appellees. 
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